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NOTES
Notes
THE INTENTION THEORY IN PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY
IN MISSOURI
In the case of Strickland Printing and Stationery Co. v.
Chenot,1 one Dodson had purchased stationery supplies from the
plaintiff, and in default of payment therefor, the plaintiff
brought suit on account against the defendants as partners inter
sese. He produced a contract between the various defendants
reciting that Dodson, as principal, desired to share profits with
his salesmen as associates. The contract allocated the various
units of profits among the principal and the associates; it pro-
vided also for an advisory board which would concern itself
with the policies of the business and the possible sales commis-
sions. The contract further provided for the establishment of a
sinking fund to be set apart from the net or overriding commis-
sions against which the losses of the enterprise were to be
charged. The court held for the defendants, denying the exis-
tence of a partnership on the ground that from a consideration
of the whole contract, there was no intention to share losses or to
form a partnership. Apart from this holding, which will be the
subject of later discussion, the case reiterates what is now a gen-
eral and well-established doctrine, namely, that a sharing of
profits is only presumptive evidence of the existence of a partner-
ship and is no longer the determinative test.2
In 1775 the English case of Grace v. Smith3 announced as a
positive rule that all those persons who shared the profits of a
business were liable as partners in that business, regardless of
whether as between themselves a partnership was contracted for,
or even regardless of whether the creditors of the enterprise had
relied upon an apparent partnership relation. As stated in
Waugh v. Carver4 eighteen years later, the basis for the decision
was the belief that by taking a part of the profits, one takes from
the creditors a part of that fund which is the security for the
payment of their debts. That this reasoning is utterly unwar-
ranted is very positively brought out in Eastman v. Clark,5
I (Mo. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 937.
2 Philips v. Samuels (1882) 76 Mo. 657; In re Whitlaw's Estate (1914)
184 Mo. App. 229, 167 S. W. 463; Meehan v. Valentine (1891) 145 U. S. 611,
12 S. Ct. 972; Bates, PARTNERSHIP (1888) secs. 15, 23, 47; Uniform Part-
nership Act, sec. 7, subd. 4.
2 W. B1. 998, 96 Eng. Repr. 587.
'(1793) 2 H. B1. 235, 126 Eng. Repr. 525.
5 (1872) 53 N. H. 276. For a cogent display of the power of this opinion
see, 1 Rowley, PARTNERSHIP (1916) sec. 57.
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which has become a leading case by reason of its condemnation
of the profit-sharing test as the conclusive determinant of the
existence of a partnership. The primary basis for the rule in
Waugh v. Carver was the desire to retain intact the profits of the
business in order to secure more fully to the creditors the pay-
ment of the debts owed to them, relying on the assumption that
creditors normally expect payment from the profits. This as-
sumption cannot be justified, for the profits consist of capital re-
maining after liabilities are paid and not before. The sharing
of profits presupposes the prior satisfaction of creditors. The
fund to which a creditor looks for satisfaction lies rather in the
assets of a business and its capital, and it is upon these assets
that the solidity of a business depends. Quite often a business
realizes no profits; in such a situation the creditors would look
to a non-existent fund for payment. Nevertheless, the rule in
these cases was followed to a considerable extent by American
courts,0 and until 1860 this was the one test almost universally
applied for the purpose of determining the existence of a
partnership.
In 1860, however, the English case of Cox 'v. Hickman 7 repudi-
ated the test of profit-sharing as conclusive evidence of a part-
nership, and placed liability on the ground of mutual agency-
"but the real ground of liability is that the trade has been car-
ried on by persons acting in his behalf." In the United States,
the case of Cox v. Hickman has been quite generally followed, so
far as it repudiates the profit-sharing test.8 And sharing in
profits is now most generally recognized as establishing only a
prima facie case, that is, it is presumptive evidence of the exis-
tence of a partnership, 9 which may however be rebutted by the
absence of various other elements which are yet to be considered.
In at least one state, however, the sharing of profits except as
payment for services, is conclusive evidence of partnership. 10
6 Mechem, PARTNERSHIP (1920) 79; Oppenheimer v. Clemmons (1883) 18
F. 886; Parker v. Caufield (1870) 37 Conn. 250, 9 Am. Rep. 320; Hubbell v.
Woolf (1860) 15 Ind. 204; Pratt v. Langdon (1867) 97 Mass. 97, 93 Am.
Dec. 61; Dob v. Halsey (N. Y. 1819) 16 Johns. 34, 8 Am. Dec. 293.
7 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 11 Eng. Repr. 431. For affirmation of this doctrine see,
Bullen v. Sharp (1865) L. R. 1 C. P. 86, 144 Eng. Repr. 583; (1923) 36
HARv. L. REv. 1016.
8 Berthold v. Goldsmith (1861) 24 How. 536; Cadahy Packing Co. v.
Hibon (1908) 92 Miss. 234, 46 So. 73, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 975; Wade v.
Hornaday (1914) 92 Kans. 293, 140 Pac. 870; (1888) 2 HARV. L. Rnv. 180
(sharing of profits is only evidence, as any other evidence, that the transac-
tion is to be judged as a whole). Jones v. Bruce (Mo. App. 1919) 211 S. W.
692; Whittling v. Schreiber (Mo. App. 1918) 202 S. W. 418.
9 See authorities cited in n. 2 above.
10 Dilley v. Albright (1898) 19 Tex. Civ. App. 487, 48 S. W. 548.
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It has been said that the Texas case of Thompson v. Schmitt"
"marks a recrudescence at a very late day of the old discredited
profit-sharing test of the existence of a partnership."' 2 The
court selects the test of profit-sharing in accord with a policy
which insists either upon liability, or association in accordance
with statutory regulation, and on this ground practically refuses
to recognize the business trust as a method of attaining limited
liability.
With the practical abolition of this so-called partnership as to
third persons, the field of partnership became quite generally
divided into two great types, first, the partnership inter sese, the
true and real partnership, and, second, the partnership by estop-
pel, which is not in fact a partnership, but a liability enforced
under the doctrine of estoppel for the sake of those who, in their
dealings with the members associated together, relied on the ap-
pearance of a partnership. The latter is a class with which this
paper is not particularly concerned; the tests by which the
former, the real partnership, is established are however to be
considered.
Partnership in this sense is the result of an agreement, ex-
pressed or implied, to join in a common enterprise; it is a volun-
tary association of persons, and it is this volitional element in
the formation of the contract of association which leads the
courts to a consideration of intention as the controlling factor.
It is perhaps unfortunate that it has not always been stated that
the consideration of intention in finding a partnership is merely
a corollary to the principles governing the construction of agree-
ments as was done in Polk v. Buchanan.'3 It is the legal inten-
tion as displayed by the contract, or in the absence of an express
agreement, as displayed by the surrounding facts and circum-
stances, rather than the expressed or actual intention that
governs. This is founded upon the rule of construction that the
parties intend the legal consequences of their voluntary acts.
"Greater effect may be given, however, to the expressed inten-
tions of the parties when the question arises between them-
selves only, than where third persons are concerned."' 4 But the
legal effect of the contract is the controlling factor.15 The name
which the partners apply to themselves, the title which they af-
" (1925) 115 Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554.
12 (1925) 39 HARV. L. Rav. 276.
'3 (Tenn. 1857) 5 Sneed 721.
14Mechem, op. cit. 65.
is Illinois Malleable Iron Co. v. Reed (1897) 102 Iowa 538, 71 N. W. 423;
Bradley v. Ely (1900) 24 Ind. App. 2, 56 N. E. 44; Wade v. Hornaday
(1914) 92 Kans. 293, 140 Pac. 870; Magovern v. Robertson (1889) 111 N. Y.
61, 22 N. E. 398; Stewart v. Stovall (1921) 191 Ky. 508, 230 S. W. 929.
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fix is not conclusive, and an express agreement that they should
not be partners is inoperative if the contract in law constitutes
a partnership. 6 Likewise, although the parties especially term
themselves partners, if the contract in law does not create a part-
nership relationship, they are not partners.' 7 But, having found
the existence of a contract, and the meaning of its terms, the
courts must then employ certain tell-tale sign-posts which point
either to or from a partnership status. The question is, what
constitutes a given relationship a partnership inter sese in law?
In answer to it there are several criteria which are generally
applied.
One of the foremost of these is the profit-sharing element dis-
cussed above. But as was suggested, it is only evidence, and at
the most presumptive evidence that a partnership was contracted
for; the profits must be received as profits,' 8 not as compensation
for services,' 9 nor as rental,20 nor as interest on a loan.21
A case in Iowa22 held the sharing of losses to be indispensable.
There is variation among the states as to the necessity of a loss-
sharing provision. Missouri is among those states which hold
that an agreement for the sharing of both profits and losses
does not necessarily constitute a partnership. 23 It is generally
held that the sharing of profits implies an agreement to share
losses in the absence of any express stipulation. 24 Even though
the parties do stipulate against losses, a partnership may never-
theless exist, if other elements are present, although as between
the parties the stipulation against the sharing of losses may be
enforced. 25
Another very important test or criterion has been termed the
mutual-agency test. As stated by Justice Cooley in Beecher v.
Bush,,2 6 the elements are, "community of interest in some lawful
16 Beecher v. Bush (1881) 45 Mich. 188, 7 N. W. 785, 40 Am. Rep. 465;
Martin v. Peyton (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 29 and comment thereon (1927) 2
AiA. L. J. 193.
17 Sailors v. Nixon-Jones Co. (1886) 20 Ill. App. 509; Oliver v. Gray
(1842) 4 Ark. 425.
38 Wagner v. Bugtles (1913) 151 Wis. 668, 139 N. W. 425.
19 Cassidy v. Hall (1884) 97 N. Y. 159.
2 0 Weiland v. Sell (1910) 83 Kan. 229, 109 Pac. 771.
21 Foley v. McKinley (1911) 114 Minn. 271, 131 N. W. 316. See also
U. P. A. sec. 7, subd. 4, for exceptions to the rule which raises a presump-
tion of the existence of a partnership upon a sharing of the profits.
22 Haswell v. Standring (1911) 152 Iowa 291, 132 N. W. 417.
23 Ellis v. Brand (1913) 176 Mo. App. 383, 158 S. W. 705.
24 Whitley v. Bradley (1910) 13 Col. App. 720, 110 Pac. 596. See statute
to same effect in Alabama, Ala. Civ. Code (1923) sec. 9372.
25 Mechem, op. cit. 73.
26 (1881) 45 Mich. 188, 7 N. W. 783.
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commerce or business, for the conduct of which, the parties are
mutually principals of and agents for each other, with general
powers within the scope of business, which powers, however, by
agreement between the parties themselves, may be restricted at
option to the extent even of making one the sole agent of the
others and of the business." This was assigned as the ground
for liability in Cox v. Hickman, and accepted and re-enforced in
a leading Ohio case, Harvey v. Childs27; therefore the true test
of partnership is left to be that of the relation of the parties as
principal and agent. This test, however, has, it seems, obvious
logical defects. Partnership is not the creature of mutual
agency, rather it is the creator. Mutual agency follows from the
establishment of a partnership as an incident thereof. It is not
the cause for the existence of a partnership status; it is a result.
"Such a test seems to give a synonym rather than a definition;
another name for the conclusion, rather than a statement of the
premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. ' 28 "Mutual
agency is not a test of partnership, because the existence of such
a relation is the very question in issue.' '29 Besides, mutual
agency is not conclusive from the existence of a partnership,
since it does not always result, nor does a partnership always re-
sult from a mutual agency, for mutual agencies are not neces-
sarily partnerships.
Another consideration which may become important in the
quest for the legal intention is common ownership of property.
Such ownership is a normal incident of the partnership set-up,
and hence evidence of the existence of one; but it is not entitled
to any decisive weight since both co-tenancy and joint tenancy do
not depend necessarily upon consent and inter-party contract,
and hence the necessary and essential voluntary element in an
association as partners might be absent, and thus preclude the
presence of the partnership condition. Where, however, co-
owners of property use such property in carrying on a joint
business, they become partners.U0 The endeavor must be an en-
terprise, a business, not merely an agreement to do a piece of
work, or a single, independent act.31
Thus, it is seen that no one of the tests referred to is, nor can
be, conclusive in itself. It is merely persausive as evidence of
the legal intention to form a partnership relation which is in its
essence a joining as co-owners, or principals, in carrying on a
business for profit. At least these elements are contained in
27 (1876) 28 Ohio St. 319, 22 Ant Rep. 387.
28 Meehan v. Valentine (1892) 145 U. S. 611, 12 S. Ct. 972.
2, Boreing v. Wilson (1908) 128 Ky. 14, 108 S. W. 914.
so Gilmore, PARTNFasHiP (1911) sec. 13.
J1 Ibid. sec. 14.
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every workable definition, 32 and they are entirely compatible
with the test defined by the Uniform Partnership Act.33
An interesting theory which Mr. Douglas in his article, Vica-
rious Liability and Administration of Risk,34 favors as most
capable of reconciling the multitude of varying decisions, is
called the entrepeneur theory of liability or co-enterpriser's part-
nership liability. This theory has not been articulated by the
courts, but a short review of it might prove profitable. It is
founded on the idea that losses or liabilities are merely cost
items in the conduct of a business, and consequently the con-
sumer of the product should and Would ultimately pay them. In
any case, therefore, where the consumer would bear the brunt
of these cost-items, there exists an enterprise, managed and
owned by enterprisers. If there are co-enterprisers engaged in
the business, they are partners. The test in establishing whether
the parties are enterprisers is fourfold: (1) Control--or the
ability to make and execute decisions governing the functions
of the business; (2) Ownership-legal or equitable title to prop-
erty used in the production process; (3) Profit-sharing-in the
net income of the business; (4) Losses-the money or property
staked in the enterprise. Now, there must be a voluntary agree-
ment entered into by the parties which allocates these four fac-
tors. If the parties to the agreement each possess the majority
of the four ear-marks, there is a partnership, for they are then
co-enterprisers. If but two of these qualities are present, the
party bearing the burden of proof fails to establish his case, and
there is no partnership. Mr. Douglas emphasizes the necessity
of the control and profit-sharing ear-marks, claiming that with-
out either of these, the capacity to distribute losses among the
consumers cannot exist.35
From this summary consideration of the tests before referred
to, it is clear that the various factors are only collectively de-
terminative. And the legal intention of the parties is important
only insofar as these factors are present or absent. References
to intention must be understood to mean the legal effect of the
contract and conduct of the parties, in other words, a merejuristic extension of the volitional element necessary in associ-
ating parties together as partners.
It is at this point that the principal case, Strickland Co. v.
Chenot, diverges from the well-accepted doctrines, at least in
32Mechem. op. cit. sec. 1, Gilmore, op. cit. sec. 1 and footnotes.
w U. P. A. sec. 6. "A partnership is an association of two or more per-
sons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
3 4
- Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk II (1929) 38
YALE L. J. 720. Malvern Natl. Bank v. Halliday (1923) 195 Iowa 734, 192
N. W. 843.
35 Ibid. See also (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1152.
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phraseology. Missouri cases have in the past relied on the in-
tention test as an important one, and have constantly laid stress
on its efficacy as a controlling factor, intention, neverthelesss,
being limited to legal effect, and not to the actual state of mind
of the parties.36 But in 1922, the case of National Bank of Com-
merce v. Francis37 was decided. That case was an action by a
national bank on the notes of a construction company, organized
by the first mortgage bondholders of a railroad company. These
bondholders had agreed to foreclose, and had purchased the rail-
road property at the foreclosure sale through a reorganization
committee which they appointed. The plaintiff proceeded on the
theory that the construction company was a dummy corporation
acting as the agent of the bondholders as partners inter sese.
The reorganization agreement gave the committee power to bor-
row money for specified purposes, and stipulated that the bond-
holders were not partners, and that liability was limited to the
assets of the business, that is, the subscribers were to be liable
only to the extent of their shares. The subscribers were to re-
ceive the profits through the committee. The committee was em-
powered to sell the property for certain purposes subject to the
approval of the majority of the subscribers, and further, a ma-
jority of the subscribers might change the powers of the com-
mittee. The notes which were sued upon were, however, spe-
cially limited to the securities pledged for payment thereof. The
court held that there was no partnership, saying that although
there was an agreement to share profits, the parties must also
have agreed and intended to share losses and become partners.
And because there is no "single syllable" in the document con-
templating that the defendants were to be liable for the losses,
or intended to become partners, they cannot be partners. It
seems evident from the authorities cited by the court, that it
believed its decision to be in entire accord with the general law.
It is submitted that this decision is out of line with the precepts
hereinbefore established insofar as partnership law is concerned.
The result reached is entirely justifiable on the ground that the
powers of contract are wide, and by invoking this contractual
power, parties may limit their liability to a particular fund; so,
a stipulation in the particular notes, specially limiting payment
to particular property may be effective and enforceable. But the
dicta in reference to partnership, and the unnecessary decision
Hindeman v. Secoy (Mo. App. 1920) 218 S. W. 416; Ellis v. Brand
(1913) 176 Mo. App. 383, 158 S. W. 705; Graf Distilling Co. v. Wilson
(1913) 172 Mo. App. 612, 156 S. W. 23; Sawyer v. Burris (1909) 141 Mo.
App. 318, 121 S. W. 321; Allen v. Coglizer (Mo. App. 1919) 208 S. W. 102;
In Re Whitlow's Estate (1914) 184 Mo. App. 229, 167 S. W. 463; Jones v.
Bruce (Mo. App. 1919) 211 S. W. 692.
7 296 Mo. 169, 246 S. W. 326.
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that there was no partnership here is not justifiable. There was
here a sharing of profits, establishing a prima facie case, and
from the spirit of the contract it is clear that the subscribers
were to receive the profits, not as creditors, but as owners and
operators; there was a co-ownership of property which is per-
suasive; there was an element of control in the subscribers which
would normally be sufficient to prevent the formation of a busi-
ness trust.38 There was, however, an express agreement negativ-
ing the loss-sharing element, and an express refusal to become
liable as partners. As has been seen above, unwillingness to
share losses is of no consequence as against third persons, if the
other elements of a partnership are present. Sharing of losses
is more of an incident of partnership than a test for its existence.
Few people would willingly contract to be individually liable in
so huge an undertaking. Nor is it necessary under the prevail-
ing law that the parties consciously intend to become parties; if
the result and effect of the contract is to make them partners,
partners they are,3 9 for parties intend the legal-consequences
of their voluntary acts, and if the legal consequences unite in
assuming the shape of a partnership status, the parties are part-
ners. Here, then, there was an adoption, probably unaware, of
a doctrine that is not justifiable in law. It is unfortunate that
it has been repeated since by the Missouri court.
In Darling v. Buddy,4o suit was brought for an accounting and
contribution by the defendants as partners for judgments paid
by the plaintiff. Under an agreement, the entire capital stock of
a railway was to be vested in five syndicate managers who were
to hold title, borrow money, manage the business in their sound
discretion, and in general, to have complete control; the sub-
scribers were to share in the profits according to the amount of
their contributions, and in the losses in proportion to their sub-
scriptions. There was expressed an intention not to be partners.
The court held that they were not partners, applying the test
of National Bank of Commerce v. Francis, saying that there
must be, besides an agreement to share profits, an agreement to
share losses and become partners, thus repudiating the general
course of decisions to the effect that the test is a sharing of
profits as co-owners or principals, in order to foster the illegiti-
mate infant-child of the Francis case.
Here again, the application of the loss-sharing and expressed
intention test was superfluous. The subscribers had no voice
38 Hoadley v. City Commissioners of Boston (1870) 105 Mass. 519.
39 "Partnership is a status, and may exist by reason of the terms of the
agreement, although the parties thereto incorporate therein a declaration
to the contrary," (1927) 2 AmA. L. J. 193. Green v. Whaley (1917) 271 Mo.
136, 197 S. W. 355.
40 (1927) 318 Mo. 784, 1 S. W. (2d) 163.
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whatsoever, in the management of the enterprise. All title to
the property, and all control, were centered in the five managers.
The subscribers merely shared in the profits. This set-up com-
prises a clear business trust. A case in Arkansas 41 with similar
facts, held outright that this situation presented a common-law
business trust, with the trustees liable fully, but the cestuis liable
only to the extent of their subscriptions.
In a 1928 Missouri case,42 a man and a woman who were
betrothed pooled a portion of their resources, and bought and
sold stocks for their common benefit, apparently in order to raise
money to buy a home. The court held that the parties did not
contemplate a partnership, and none existed; that there must be
an intention to enter into a contract of partnership, and that
this situation did not indicate a contract, but was merely an ad-
venture in buying and selling stocks. Although the decision can
be justified on the latter ground, that is, the activity was not a
business enterprise, but a mere joint adventure, the case lays
alarming stress on the absence of a clear intention to enter into
a contract of partnership. A recurrence to the Francis test is
found in a later case, Taussig v. Poindexter,43 properly held to
be a clear business trust, the court saying, "To constitute a part-
nership, there must be an agreement that each shall share in the
profits, and be personally liable for his share of the losses."
In the principal case, the intention dogma as introduced in
1922 indicated its cumulative potency. There was in the con-
tract involved a power to remove any associate, and a provision
for unequal voting power, which are not usually present in a
partnership, and the court was no doubt influenced by these con-
siderations. But the court held that the mere labelling of Dod-
son as principal, and of other defendants, formerly salesmen, as
associates, indicated that the erstwhile salesmen were mere em-
ployees, and further, that the establishment of a sinking fund
without mention of contribution to the losses excluded any in-
tention to contribute, and therefore there did not exist the neces-
sary intention to share losses and form a partnership. It is diffi-
cult to understand why a failure to stipulate for individual lia-
bility excludes the intention to form a partnership, when an ex-
press refusal to be liable is of no avail, especially if the status
which is provided for comprises a partnership. Furthermore,
the sinking fund was to be derived from the net or overriding
commission which each one of the associates earned and shared,
41 Betts v. Hackathorn (1923) 159 Ark. 621. See also Thompson v.
Schmitt (1925) 115 Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554, practically denying the validity
of business trusts, and holding all individually liable as partners, with the
ultimate test being profit-sharing.
42 Furlong v. Druke (Mo. App. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 162.
48 (1930) 224 Mo. App. 580, 30 S. W. (2d) 635.
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so that there was actually contribution to the losses by each of
the associates, ergo, also an intention to contribute, although the
contribution was to be made in a specified way and manner.
There was here a community of interest in the business as such, a
sharing in the profits, and a measure of control in each party to
the contract. To this extent they were all principals who shared
in the profits, and they should have been held to be partners.
The net result of this case is a recognition of an anomalous type
of enterprise, not quite a principal-agent relationship, not quite
a partnership, but a principal-associate status hitherto unknown,
with no reason to recommend its adoption as another means of
attaining limited liability without complying with prescribed
statutory regulation.
In cases of this type, it would seem to be the policy of the Mis-
souri courts to recognize and favor a liability limited to particu-
lar property. There is no objection to allowing a limited lia-
bility where there is such a provision contained in the indepen-
dent contracts with third parties, but there is some question as
to the wisdom of a policy which in effect allows parties contract-
ing inter sese, by such contracts to limit liability as to third per-
sons, not the contracting parties. And although some argument
might be made in its favor in large group action, there are statu-
tory means of protection against full liability which should be
employed for that purpose.
If the intention doctrine which Missouri has articulated since
1922 is an unconscious divergence from the prevailing view, then
it is submitted that a conscious revision by the courts, or at least
a disclosure of the policy intended to be served would be fitting.
If, however, the adoption of the expressed intention and loss-
sharing criteria as determinative in the formation of a partner-
ship status is conscious and purposive, it is clear that the Mis-
souri courts are clinging to a doctrine foreign to the prevailing
view of Anglo-American partnership law.
STANLEY MORTON RICHMAN, '33.
THE MAIN PURPOSE RULE AND THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS AS APPLIED TO PROMISES TO ANSWER
FOR THE PRE-EXISTING DEBT OF ANOTHER
Where a statute passed to prevent frauds and perjuries is
actually used to enable a person to acquire a benefit and then
prevent any inquiry as to whether he promised to pay for this
benefit, there is an inevitable tendency of the courts to try to dis-
cover some way by which such a person can be forced to perform
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss4/11
